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Abstract. In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, 
Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for 
analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of 
agriculture. This new approach take into account: the role of specific institutional 
environment  (formal and informal “rules of the game”, distribution of various 
rights between individuals, and systems of enforcement of rights and rules; 
behavioral characteristics of agents (preferences, bounded rationality, tendency for 
opportunism, risk aversion, trust); costs of governance and critical factors of 
transactions (uncertainty, frequency, asset specificity, and appropriability); 
comparative efficiency of market, private, public and hybrid modes of governance; 
efficiency of alternative modes for public intervention; complementarities between 
different modes; needs for multilateral and multilevel governance; technological 
and ecological factors. 
Keywords. governance of socio-economic dynamics and sustainable development; 
market, private, public and hybrid modes of governance; agrarian development 
Introduction 
The problem of effective governance of socio-economic dynamics of agriculture is 
among the most topical issues in academic, business, and policies debates in developed, 
transitional, and developing countries [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Different societies achieve to a 
different extend the economic, social, environmental, intra and inter-generational goals 
of agrarian development, and that depends on a great variety of political, economical, 
natural, technological, international etc. factors. It is increasingly recognized that 
specific governing structure, responsible for a particular (social) order in each country 
and community plays a crucial role. It affects in dissimilar ways individuals behavior, 
gives unlike incentives to use natural, technological and market opportunities, 
command different costs, and lead to diverse actual performances.  
Despite that “the institutional aspect” is largely ignored and a “normative” 
approach dominates while the costs of governance (known as transitions costs) are not 
included into analyses. Consequently, potential of market and private governing modes 
for the specific economic, institutional and natural environment in each country, region, 
sub-sector and eco-system can not be properly assessed. Nor effective modes for public 
(government, EU, international assistance) interventions in agrarian sphere designed.    
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In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction 
Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral 
and Political Sciences), and suggest a holistic framework for analyzing and 
improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamics of agriculture. This new 
approach takes into account: the role of specific institutional environment; behavioral 
characteristics of individual agents; transaction costs associated with various forms of 
governance; critical factors of agrarian activity and exchanges; comparative efficiency 
of market, private, public and hybrid modes; efficiency of alternative modes for public 
intervention; complementarities between different modes; needs for multilateral and 
multilevel governance; technological and ecological factors. 
1. Governance matters 
1.1. Failure of the traditional framework 
The division and specialization of labor, and related exchange and cooperation, open up 
enormous opportunities for increasing productivity and socio-economic dynamic in 
agriculture2. It let producing additional value (better resource management, bigger 
output, maximum economies of scale and scope) and creates incentives for deepening 
individual’s specialization and exchanges. Furthermore, it leads to division of 
traditional agrarian activity and development of huge new sectors of economy such as: 
agrarian research and innovation, agrarian inputs production, agricultural services, 
proper farming, processing of farm products, marketing of farm and food products, 
agrarian crediting, agrarian insurance etc.   
Specialization and exchange also increase (inter)dependency between individuals 
(demand, opportunistic behavior, monopoly situation) replacing or minimizing 
traditional “dependence from nature”. What is more, nowadays this dependency is no 
anymore restricted to sectoral and national borders. For example, the level of agrarian 
sustainability in certain countries or regions of South America, Africa and Asia is 
heavily dependent on development of biotechnology, state of the economy, funding or 
demand for specific (low-cost, origins, organic, fair-trade) products in North America 
and Europe.  
In the traditional (Neoclassical Economics) framework there is only one 
mechanism for governing the overall economic activity. Free market prices and market 
competition effectively coordinate and stimulate relations and activities of resource 
owners, producers and consumers. Individuals adapt to price movements and new 
(technological, production, consumption) opportunities, and trade available resources 
(and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the possibilities for increasing 
productivity (social output), maximizing consumption and welfare, and achieving 
sustainable development3. Socio-economic dynamics and maximum efficiency (known 
as Pareto optimum) is reached through the governance of “invisible hand of market”. 
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Nevertheless, there are recognized a number of cases of “market failure” which 
interrupt sustainable agrarian development. Major instances of market deficiencies are 
associated with:  
• “negative and positive externalities” [7] - free-market prices do not always 
reflect the effect on third party’s welfare, and an elimination of the differences 
between the “social” and “private” prices (“internalization of externalities”) 
through public taxes, norms etc. is suggested; 
• “tragedy of commons” [8] - in a situation of multiple users and open access to 
natural resources, there are strong individual interests for overusing 
(ultimately destroying) common resources since private costs are not 
proportionate to private benefits. Therefore, strict management of common 
goods through government regulation is suggested; 
• multi-functionality or joint production character of agriculture [2] – besides 
“private goods” agriculture produce “public goods” (rural amenities, 
ecological and cultural services, habitat for wildlife, biodiversity) and “public 
bads” (wastes, pollution). Much of the “non-commodity” output is “not-
separable” from the major farming activities. For these public goods and bads 
no markets exist or function very poorly, and farmers need special incentives 
(public contract) to produce them in a socially demanded scale. 
Thus the needs for public governance (regulation, funding, tax) are acknowledged. 
What is more, it has been demonstrated there are a great number of non-market (private 
and collective) modes which deal effectively with above problems – voluntary 
initiatives, codes of behavior, contractual arrangements, cooperatives etc. [9, 10].  
Coase discovered one more important aspect of market failure caused by the fact 
that “there are costs of using the price mechanism” [11]. Very often the high 
transaction costs of outside exchange (finding best prices and partners, negotiating 
conditions of exchange, protecting from opportunistic behavior and risks) makes it 
more profitable to carry out division and cooperation of labor within an organization 
(firm, group farm) instead across the market. Likewise, the internal management of 
transactions is also associated with costs (for directing, stimulating and supervising 
hired labor; coordination and controlling activity of partners) which restricts unlimited 
expansion of borders of an organization. Thus a transaction will be carried in an 
organization if the costs are lower than for governing that transaction across market or 
in another organization. Consequently, the distribution of overall (agrarian) activities 
between different farms, organizations, and markets will be determined by the 
comparative costs for using various governing arrangements as the most efficient 
one(s) (minimizing internal and external transaction costs) will tend to prevail [12].  
Coase also proved that the problem of “social costs” does not exist in a world of 
zero transaction costs and well-defined private rights [13]. Situation of maximum 
efficiency is always achieved through private contracts between individuals 
independent of the initial allocation of rights (and any needs for public intervention). 
However, when transaction costs are significant, then costless negotiation and 
exchange of rights is not possible. Therefore, the initial allocation of property rights 
between individuals is critical for the overall efficiency and sustainability4.  
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What is more, when important rights are not well-defined (e.g. rights on clean air 
and water; intellectual properties etc.) that creates big difficulties in efficient use of 
resources and/or (mutually) beneficial exchange 5 . Consequently, some essential 
activities (and transactions) are not carried out at socially effective scale, and the 
existing governing structures less contribute to sustainable development [14]. North 
proved that the institutional structures for carrying out economic activities is an 
important factor, which eventually determine the outcome of the system and the type of 
the development [15]. 
If transaction costs were zero then mode of the governance would not be of 
economic importance [12]. In such a world individuals would manage their relations 
with equal efficiency though free market (prices movements), or through private 
organizations of different types (contracts, firms), or collective decision making 
(cooperative, association), or in a nationwide hierarchy (single private or state 
company). Then technological opportunities (economies of scale and scope, maximum 
productivity) and sustainable exploration of resources would be easily achieved. All 
information for the effective potential of transactions (optimization of resources, 
satisfying various demands, respecting assigned and transferred rights) would be 
costlessly available. And individuals would costlessly protect their (absolute and 
contracted) rights and trade available resources in mutual benefit exploring the overall 
potential for socio-economic growth. 
However, in the real agrarian economy with positive transaction costs their high 
level could make difficult or even block otherwise efficient (mutually beneficial) for all 
parties transactions. For instance, despite the great pay-off of investments in agrarian 
research and innovation, market and private agents do not organize such activity 
because of their high uncertainty and low market and private appropriability [16]. Thus 
the type of governance become crucial since various modes give unequal possibilities 
for participants to realize entrepreneurial abilities, coordinate activities, stimulate 
acceptable behavior, protect rights and investments from unwanted expropriation and 
risks etc.  
Therefore, assessing efficiency of governing mechanisms for socio-economic 
dynamics is essential for defining the potential and limits of market competition and 
private initiatives as well as for designing proper modes for public (Government, 
international etc.) interventions in agrarian sector [14]. 
Specific institutional environment in which activity takes place eventually 
determines the level of economic performance in different industries, regions, countries 
or periods of history. In the long-run, institutions are endogenous parameters and the 
institutional “development” is to be included in the model along with economic, social 
and environmental components of the system. Nevertheless, nirvana rather than 
comparative institutional approach is common in most framework of analysis of socio-
economic dynamics6. Accordingly ideal norms rather than real-life and other feasible 
arrangements is used as criteria - e.g. farming model in other (e.g. developed, 
neighboring) countries, assumption for perfectly defined and enforced property rights, 
effectively working public (local, state, inter-governmental) organizations etc.  
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1.2. The mechanisms of governance 
In one person world there is no need for (any) governance since sustainable relations 
between the person and nature are achieved through a simple (production and/or 
consumption) management (“self-governance”). In the real world of limited resources, 
complex interactions between many individuals and conflicting interests, there is a 
need for effective governance (social order) to direct, coordinate, stimulate, induce and 
enforce agents efforts to accomplish a sustainable socio-economic development.  
Principally, there are four distinct mechanisms of governance:  
•  institutional environment (or “rules of the game”) – that is the distribution of 
de-facto rights and obligations between individuals, groups, communities and 
generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these rights and rules7. They 
are constituted by formal laws, regulations, standards, court decisions or 
determined by tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms. 
Enforcement of the various rights is done by state (administration, court, 
police) or other mechanisms such as community pressure, trust, reputation, 
private modes, self-enforcement etc. In the modern society a great deal of 
individuals activities and relations are regulated by some (general or specific) 
formal and informal rules. However, there is no perfect system of preset 
outside rules that can govern effectively the entire activities of individuals in 
all possible (and quite specific) circumstances of their life and relations. 
• market modes – those are various decentralized initiatives governed by free 
market price movements and market competition (spotlight exchanges, 
classical contracts, production and trade of organic products and origins, 
system of fair-trade etc.). Importance of the “invisible hand” of market for 
effective coordination and stimulation of individuals activities has been one of 
the fundamentals of modern economy (and policies for development and 
globalization). However, there has also been a great number of “market 
failures” compromising sustainable development and leading to social crisis, 
economic crisis, ecological crisis, energy crisis etc. 
• private modes (“private or collective order”) – those are diverse private 
initiatives, and specially designed contractual and organizational 
arrangements governing bilateral or multilateral relationships between private 
agents (voluntary individual or collective actions, codes of professional 
behavior, environmental contracts and cooperatives etc.). There has been 
emerging a great number of private and collective forms managed by the 
“visible hand of manager”, collective decision-making, private negotiations 
etc. governing successfully various aspects (and challenges) of socio-
economic development. Nevertheless, there are also many examples of 
“private sector failures” (lack of potential to coordinate and stimulate 
sustainability) demonstrating incapability to deal effectively with problems of 
development. 
• public modes (“public order”) – these are various forms of a third-party public 
(Government, community, international) intervention in market and private 
sectors such as public guidance, public regulation, taxation, public assistance, 
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public funding, public provision etc. The role of public (local, national and 
transnational) governance has been increasing along with intensification of 
activity and exchange, and growing interdependence of social, economic and 
environmental activities (and related problems and risks). In many cases, the 
effective organization of certain activity through market competition and/or 
private negotiation would take a long time, be very costly, could not reach 
socially desirable scale, or be impossible. Thus a centralized public 
intervention could achieve the willing state of the system faster, cheaper or 
more efficiently. Nonetheless, there are a great number of bad public 
involvements (inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation) leading to 
significant problems of sustainable development around the globe. 
• hybrid forms – some mixture combining features of market and/or private 
and/or public governance (e.g. state certifies organic producers and enforces 
organic standards, and thus intensifies development of organic markets and 
environmental sustainability). 
Specific institutional environment is the key parameter eventually responsible for 
the outcome of socio-economic development [15]. It affects human behavior and 
directs (governs) individuals’ activities “in a predictable way” creating dissimilar 
incentives, restrictions and costs for intensifying exchange, increasing productivity, 
inducing private and collective initiatives, developing new rights, decreasing 
divergence between social groups and regions, responding to ecological and other 
challenges. For example, (socially) acceptable norms for use of labor (employment of 
children, safety standards, minimum wages), plant and livestock (animal welfare, 
preservation of biodiversity, usage of GM crops), and environmental resources (water 
use rights; permissions for pollution), all they could differ even between various 
regions of the same country. 
The institutional “development” is initiated by public authority, international 
actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and private and collective actions of 
individuals8. It is associated with modernization and/or redistribution of existing rights; 
and evolution of new rights and emergence of novel (private, public, hybrid) 
institutions for their enforcement. For instance, sustainability initially evolved 
as ”movements” and a “new ideology” in developed countries. Afterward this “new 
concept” extended and instituted in the body of formal laws, regulations and public 
support programs. Numerous decentralized initiatives of producers and consumers 
have been wide-spreading (codes of ethical behavior, organic farming, system of fair-
trade) being important part of (pushing up) institutional modernization in the area.   
Diverse institutional environment contributes to a different extend to achieving 
economic, social, environmental etc. goals of development. For instance, private rights 
on major agrarian resources were not well-defined during post-communist transition in 
Bulgaria. That led to domination of low productive, unsustainable and “gray” 
structures; sharp decline in major productions and ineffective use of national resources; 
and serious socio-economic and environmental problems [18].  
“Rational” agents pursue their goals and benefit from the specialization and 
available resources using diverse modes of governance – compete and/or cooperate 
with each others, and/or exchange rights and resources, and/or obey to an external 
private, collective or public order. Depending on efficiency of the system of 
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(community), and require a multidisciplinary analysis and explanation [15]. 
governance which is put in place, the outcome of development is quite different with 
diverse levels of socio-economic progression (Figure 1). Now it is widely recognized 
that enormous world potential for increasing food production is not effectively used 
because of the bad governance which slow-down scientific and technological progress, 
impede development of markets and private organizations, allow particular groups to 
benefits from status-quos, and lead to constant food crisis and unsustainable 
“development”.  
 
 
Figure 1. Governing mechanisms for socio-economic dynamics of agriculture. 
1.3. The costs of governance 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with the protection and exchange of 
individuals’ rights [19]. In addition to production costs, economic agents make 
significant costs for governing of their relations with other agents (individuals, private 
entities, public authorities). For example, farmers have costs for finding best prices and 
partners for land, inputs and labor supply, financing, marketing of outputs; negotiating 
conditions of exchange; completing (writing down) contract or setting up a partnership 
organization; coordination through a collective decision-making or direct managerial 
orders; enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring, 
safeguarding; disputing through a court system or another way; adjusting or 
termination along with changing market, institutional, and natural environment. 
Institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs. For 
instance, when private rights are well defined and protected, and (public) system for 
contract enforcement work well - that facilitates transactions between individuals and 
effective allocation of resources. (Development of) institutional environment also 
imposes significant (transaction) costs to agents – e.g. for studying out and complying 
with various institutional restrictions (community or state norms, regulations, 
standards), formal registration of contracts and entities, efforts to deal with bureaucracy 
etc. A good example in this respect are current problems of many Bulgarian farms to 
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meet new EU standards (“institutionally determined” costs) related to product quality, 
food safety, labor conditions, eco-protection, animal welfare etc. [20].  
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality 
and tendency for opportunism [12]. Economic agents do not possess full information 
about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, adverse effects of their activities on 
others, trends in development) since collection and processing of such information 
would be either very expensive or impossible9. In order to optimize decision-making 
(to reach the state of efficiency) they have to spent costs for "increasing their imperfect 
rationality" – for data collection, analysis, forecasting, training etc.  
Individuals are also given to opportunism and if there is opportunity for some 
agent to get non-punishably extra rent from exchange (performing unwanted exchange) 
he will likely “steal” others rights. Two major forms of opportunism can be 
distinguished: pre-contractual ("adverse selection") - when some partner uses the 
"information asymmetry" to negotiate better contract terms; and post-contractual 
("moral hazard") - when some counterpart takes advantage of impossibility for full 
observation on his activities (by another partner or a third party) or when he takes 
"legal advantages" of unpredicted changes in transacting conditions (costs, prices, 
weather). A third form of opportunism occurs in development of large organizations 
(known as “free-riding”). Since individual benefits are often not proportional to 
individual efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for organizational 
development and later on to benefit from the successful new organization [21].  
Commonly, it is very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-
opportunistic behavior (because of bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents 
have to safeguard their transactions and rights from the hazard of opportunism through: 
ex ante efforts to protect their “absolute” (given by dominating institutions) rights, and 
find a reliable counterpart and design efficient mode for partners credible commitments 
to “contracted” (voluntary transferred) rights; and ex post investments for overcoming 
possible opportunism (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) during 
contract execution stage. 
Technological development also affects enormously structure and level of 
transaction costs [15]. Mechanization and standardization of farming operations and 
products increases bounded rationality of manager, and diminishes possibility for 
opportunism of hired labor and counterparts. That leads to extension of activities and 
transactions under a singe management (farm size) – enlargement of internal 
transactions (internal division and specialization of labor) and outside market and 
contract transacting (procurement, trade, cooperation). Possibilities that application of 
modern production (e.g. precision farming), transportation, measurement, information, 
communication technologies gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and 
minimize related costs are immense - easy assessment and traceability; on line 
information, coordination, monitoring, detecting, advise; direct low costs exchanges 
(expressing demands, finding best prices and partners, negotiating, trading, disputing) 
and collective actions (coalition) of interested agents at national and international 
scales; rapid detection of problems and intervention by governments and international 
agencies; full participation of individuals in and control on public decision-making etc. 
There is not a singe (universal) mode for effective organization of all type of 
agrarian activity in any possible natural, institutional, and economic surroundings [22]. 
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Individual governing forms have distinct features (different advantages and 
disadvantages) to protect rights and coordinate and stimulate socially desirable 
activities. Besides, agents have specific personal characteristics – different awareness, 
entrepreneurships, preferences, risk aversion, tendency for opportunisms etc. 
Furthermore, efficiency of governing mode will depends on the specific attributes of 
each activity and transaction. Therefore, individual transaction and transaction costs are 
to be put in the centre of analysis, and comparative efficiency of feasible modes for 
governing of socially desirable activities assessed [14].  
2. Improving the governance 
2.1. Factors of governance choice 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form of governance of agrarian 
activity. For example, in Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water supply could not 
have been conducted by individual farmers (high interdependency, nonseparability of 
water use) and since earliest period water use organization developed as public projects 
[23].  
Often the choice of governing mode is pre-determined by institutional restrictions 
as some forms for carrying out farming activities, land and labor supply, trade of output 
etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal in certain countries or period of time10. 
For instance, corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many 
countries; market trade of farmland and some outputs (inputs) is illegitimate, private 
management of national ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not allowed etc.  
Generally, every agrarian activity and transaction could be governed through a 
great variety of alterative forms. For instance, a supply of environmental preservation 
service could be governed as: voluntary activity of a farmer; though private contracts of 
the farmer with interested or affected agents; though interlinked contract between the 
farmer and a supplier or processor; though cooperation (collective action) with other 
farmers and stakeholders; though (free) market or assisted by a third-party (certifying 
and controlling agent) trade with special eco, protected origins or fair-trade products; 
though a public contract specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; though a 
public order (regulation, taxation, quota for use of recourses or emissions); within a 
hierarchical public agency or by a hybrid form.  
Individual governance modes have distinct advantages and disadvantages to 
protect individuals rights, and coordinate and stimulate socially desirable activities.  
Free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand of 
market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit 
from specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated 
with high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing 
opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc.  
Special contract form (“private ordering”) permits better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguarding transactions. However, it may require large costs for 
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disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, then more 
effective modes prevail – large gray or black sectors of economy are common around the globe.  
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions,  
enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
Internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control on 
transactions (direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a 
fiat). However, extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership 
boundaries (allowing minimum technological or agronomic requirements; exploration 
of technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
Separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, public 
firm/farm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting 
efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies of 
scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in 
product promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts and authorities. 
However, it could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling 
opportunism, and adaptation. Cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from 
low capability for internal long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-
tradable character of shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
In order to select the best (most efficient) form for governing of a particular 
activity we have to assess the comparative advantages and disadvantages of practically 
possible forms for governance of that activity.  
In some cases advantages of a certain mode of governance are not difficult to 
verify - e.g. when it gives bigger benefits (achieves socially desirable/effective scale) or 
commands minimum total costs. In such cases the choice of most effective form is easy 
since we can compare directly the costs and benefits of alternatives. For instance, much 
of agrarian activity is commonly governed in family farms, supply of inputs or 
exchange of farm output are governed my market modes etc.  
In many instances, direct assessment (comparison) of costs and benefits of 
alternative governing arrangements are difficult or impossible to make. That is 
particularly true for some elements of transaction costs related to divers governance 
structures. In the later group we can include the costs for finding best partners, 
negotiation, controlling and enforcement contractual terms, organizational development, 
interlinked transacting, unrealized (failed) deals etc. [22]. Besides, it is often extremely 
complicated to separate transaction costs from traditional production expenditures11. 
For example, while executing farming operations a farmer supervises hired labor; 
during transportation of chemicals he negotiates marketing of output etc.  
What is more, component comparison of transacting costs could not always give 
idea for organizational efficiency. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of 
costs while increasing another type costs – e.g. internalization of a transaction 
(replacement of market with integral mode) is associated with reduction of costs for 
information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along 
with constantly changing conditions, safeguarding investments from outside 
opportunism. On the other hand, it enlarges costs for organizational formation, decision 
making, integral management, supervising and motivation of hired labor etc. Thus, it is 
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important to take into consideration the overall (total) costs for organization of 
transactions of different types - all external and internal costs of governance. 
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high transacting 
costs entirely block development of alternative organization. For instance, market for 
agrarian credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the transition and internal 
supply (utilization of own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible 
form for finance supply of farms [18]. Here comparative level of transaction costs is 
impossible to be determined and appreciate the “high” efficiency of the integral mode 
for finance supply. In that case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are 
not alternative at all but completely different governing structures.  
Discrete structural analysis is suggested to evaluate comparative efficiency of  
alternative governing forms [12]. This approach aims to evaluate relative (rather than 
absolute) levels of transacting costs between alternative governance modes, and select 
that one which most economize on transacting costs. Following that framework we 
have to identify the “critical dimensions” of transactions responsible for the variation 
of transaction costs. “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” have been 
identified as critical factors of transaction costs by Williamson [12] while 
“appropriability” has been added by Bachev and Labonne [16].  
When recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then both (all) 
sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding 
opportunism, building reputation, setting up adjustment mechanisms). Besides, costs 
for development of a special private mode for facilitating bilateral (multilateral) 
exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange.  
When uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for carrying 
out and secure transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding 
against risk). Certain risks could be diminished or eliminated by production 
management or through a special market mode (purchase of insurance). However, 
governance of most transacting risk would require special private forms – trade with 
origins; providing guarantees; using share-rent or output-based compensation; 
employing economic hostages; participating in risk-pooling, inputs-supply or 
marketing cooperative; complete integration [24].  
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with a particular 
partner are to be deployed. Relation specific investments are "locked" in transactions 
with a particular buyer or seller, and cannot be recovered through "faceless" market 
trade. Therefore, dependant investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a special 
form such as long-term contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, or 
ownership integration.  
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on products, 
services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of agrarian 
intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new 
varieties and technologies, software etc. Besides, all products and activities with 
significant (positive or negative) externalities are to be included in this group. If 
appropriability is low the possibility for unwanted (market or private) exchange is great, 
and the costs for protection of private rights (safeguard, detection of cheating, 
disputing) extremely high. Agents would either over produce (negative externalities) or 
under organize (positive externalities) such activity unless they are governed by  
efficient private or hybrid mode (cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, 
trade secrets, or public order).  
2.2. Principle governance matrix 
Discrete structural analysis is performed by “aligning transactions (differing in their 
attributes) with the governance structures (differing in their costs and competence) in 
discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” [12]. According to the 
combination of specific characteristics of each transaction, there will be different the 
most effective form for governing of activity (Figure 2)12.  
 
 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low 
Assets Specificity 
Low High 
Uncertainty 
Low High Low High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Free market h h 
Special contract h h 
Internal organization h h 
Third-party 
involvement 
K K 
Public intervention K 
  h - the most effective mode; K - necessity for a third party involvement 
Figure 2. Principle modes for governing of agrarian transactions. 
 
Agrarian transactions with good appropriability, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments (partner can be changed anytime without significant additional 
costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight or classical 
contracts. Organization of transactions with a special form or within farm (firm) would 
only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits. 
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. Relational 
contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at outset (high 
uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than specification of 
obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to 
settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of a frequent bilateral 
trade). Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be easily 
(costlessly) redeployed to another use or users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with low uncertainty, 
high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully 
safeguarded through contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant 
                                                          
12 Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels (high-low) of 
critical factors of transactions are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical 
dimensions, and thus of effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked governance). 
 
obligations of partners in all possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds 
transactions). The occasional character of transactions does not justify internalization 
within farm (firm).   
Transactions with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets specificity 
(dependency), and high appropriability, have to be organized within farm/firm (internal 
ownership mode). For instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite 
specific to a farm, and its supply has to be always governed through a permanent labor 
contract and coupled with ownership rights [22]. Capital investments in land are to be 
made on owned (long-leased) rather than seasonally rented land (high site and product 
specificity). All “critical” to the farm material assets will be internally organized - 
production of forage for animals; important machineries; water supply for irrigated 
farming etc. While universal capital could be effectively financed by a market form 
(e.g. bank credit), highly specific investments can be only made through internal 
funding (own funds, equity sell, joint venture).  
According to the personality of resource owners (capability, experience, 
preferences) and (transacting) costs of their coalition, different type of farm (agro-firm) 
will be efficient - one-person farm, family farm, partnership, cooperative farm, and 
corporative farms [22]. If specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively 
organized within the farm (economy of scale and scope explored, funding made), then 
effective governing form outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint 
ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying for a public intervention.  
When strong assets (capacity, time of delivery, site, branding) inter-dependency 
with upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to govern 
transactions through contract modes (strong mutual interests for cooperation and 
restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective eco-contracts between farmers and 
interested businesses (symmetrical dependency) are widely used in developed 
countries13  leading to production methods (enhanced pasture management, reduce use 
of agrochemicals, wetland preservation) protecting water from pollution. 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need effective 
(ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting costs for initiation and 
maintaining such “collective organization” is usually great (big number of coalition, 
different interests of members, “free-riding”) and it is either unsustainable or does not 
evolve at all. That creates serious problems for efficiency (and sustainability) of 
individual farms - missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation, 
impossibility to “induce” public intervention etc.  
Enormous transacting difficulties arise when condition of assets specificity is 
combined with high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Elaboration 
of special governing structure for private transacting is not justified, specific 
investments are not made, and activity (restriction of activity) fails to occur at effective 
scale ("market failure" and "contract failure"). Similar problems are encountered for 
rare transacting associated with high uncertainty and appropriability.  
In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement 
in transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them 
more efficient or possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of organic 
farming and system of fair-trade are good examples in that respect. There is increasing 
consumer’s demand (price premium) for organic and fair-trade products in developed 
                                                          
13 e.g. drinking water companies in Germany [25] and mineral water company Vittel in France [26]. 
countries. Nevertheless their supply could not be met unless effective trilateral 
governance (including independent certification and control) has been put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction is low, there is no pure market 
mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Nevertheless, respecting others rights 
(unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting out” additional rights (needed transactions 
carried) could be governed by “good will” or charity actions of individuals, NGOs, 
government or international organizations. For instance, a great number of voluntary 
environmental initiatives (agreements) have emerged driven by competition in food 
industries, farmers’ preferences for eco-production, and responds to public pressure for 
sound environmental management14. However, environmental standards are usually 
“process-based”, and “environmental audit” is not conducted by independent party, 
which does not guarantee “performance outcome”. Recent huge food safety, animal 
safety, and eco-scandals have demonstrated that such private schemes could often fail 
(high bounded rationality and possibility for opportunism).  
In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand 
especially if they require significant costs. Some private modes could be employed if a 
high frequency (pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual assets dependency 
(thus incentive to cooperate) exists. In these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, 
bilateral or collective agreements, close-membership cooperatives, codes of 
professional behavior, alliances, internal organization etc. are used. However, emerging 
of special (private) large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability 
(and satisfying entire “social” demand) would be very slow and expensive, and they 
unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, there is a 
strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international 
assistance) intervention in order to make such activity possible or more effective [22].  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of low appropriability, 
high uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, 
contracting, charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, supply of 
additional environmental protection and improvement service is very costly (in terms 
of production and organization costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary 
basis. Besides, financial compensation of farmers by willing consumers through a pure 
market mode is also ineffective due to high information asymmetry, and massive 
enforcement costs. A third-party mode with a direct public involvement would make 
that transaction effective: on behalf of consumers State agency negotiates with 
individual farmers a contract for “environment conservation and improvement service”, 
coordinates activities of various agents (including direct production management), 
provides public payments for compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of 
negotiated terms15. 
2.3. Improving modes of public intervention 
There is a big variety of possible forms for public intervention in market and private 
activities. Comparative analysis is to extend to public modes and include:  
                                                          
14  Unprecedented development of “codes of behaviors”, eco-labeling and branding, environmental 
cooperatives, and “green alliances”, all they are good examples.  
15 Public environmental contracts with individual farmers have been broadly used in EU as effective form 
for governing the supply of environmental preservation and improvement services [1]. 
 
First, assessing the correspondence of public involvement to the real needs of 
socio-economic development – identified needs for a third-party intervention from 
Figure 2. 
Second, assessment of comparative advantages of alternative modes for public 
involvements comprising all costs – direct (tax payer, assistance agency) expenses, and 
transacting costs of bureaucracy (for coordination, stimulation, mismanagement), and 
costs for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes (expenses for 
information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes), and costs for community control 
over and reorganization of bureaucracy (modernization and liquidation of public 
modes), and (opportunity) costs of public inaction.  
Third, estimation of comparative efficiency of selected and other feasible modes of 
governance of socially desirable activity - partnership with private sector, property 
rights modernization etc. Accordingly, public intervention is to be initiated only if there 
is overall net benefit - when effects are greater than additional (individual and social) 
costs for the third-party involvement [14].   
Depending on uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific investment of 
public involvement, there will be different most effective forms (Figure 3). 
Interventions with low uncertainty and assets specificity would require smaller 
Government organization (more regulatory modes; improvement of general laws and 
contract enforcement). When uncertainty and assets specificity of transactions increases 
a special contract mode would be necessary – employment of public contracts for 
provision of private services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary 
labor contract for carrying out special public programs, leasing out public assets for 
private management etc. When transactions are characterized with high assets 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency then internal mode and bigger public 
organization would be necessary – permanent public employment contracts, in-house 
integration of crucial assets in a specialized state agency or public company. 
 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                                ←-----------------------------------→                                  High 
New property 
rights 
Public 
regulations 
Public 
taxation 
Public 
assistance  
Public 
funding 
Public 
provision 
Figure 3. Principle modes for effective public intervention. 
 
In the beginning, existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, 
failures) in organization of market and private transactions have to be specified. The 
appropriate government involvement would be to create environment for: decreasing 
uncertainty surrounding market and private transactions, increasing intensity of 
exchange, protecting private rights and investments, making private investments less 
dependent etc. For instance, State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-
standards for farm inputs and produces, certifies producers and users of natural 
resources, regulates employment relations, transfers water management rights to farms 
associations, sets up minimum farm-gate prices etc. All that facilitates and intensifies 
market and private transactions and enhance socio-economic growth of agriculture.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have 
to be considered. Low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified 
private rights [22]. In some cases, most effective government intervention would be to 
introduce and enforce new private property rights – rights for clean, beautiful 
environment, biodiversity; private rights on natural, biological, and environmental 
resources; private rights for (non) profit management of natural resources; private 
rights on intellectual agrarian property, origins, (protecting) eco-system services; rights 
on issuing eco-bonds and shares; tradable quotas (permits) for polluting; private 
liability for polluting etc. That would be efficient when privatization of resources or 
introduction (and enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs 
(uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific investment are low). Government 
intervention effectively transfers organization of transactions into market and private 
governance, liberalizes market competition and induces private incentives 
(investments) in certain activities (Figure 2). 
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place public regulations for 
production, trade, and utilization of resources and products – standards for labor (safety, 
social security), product quality, environmental performance, animal welfare, good 
farming practices; norms for using natural resources, introduction of foreign species 
and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; bans on application of 
certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for organic farming, biodiversity and 
landscape management, trading ecosystem service protection; certifications and 
licensing; mandatory eco-labeling and eco-training; foreign trade regimes etc. 
In other cases, using incentives and restrictions of tax system would be the most 
effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, breaks, 
credits) are widely used to create favorable conditions for development of certain 
(sub)sectors, regions, forms of organization, segment of population, or types of 
activities. Environmental taxation on emissions, products (inputs, outputs) and wastes 
is also increasingly applied to change the eco-behavior of agents and reduce harmful 
impact. Likewise, tax or levies schemes on farming or export are employed for funding 
innovations and extension service etc. 
Often providing public assistance and support to private organizations is the best 
form of intervention – recommendations, information, demonstrations, and training; 
mediation in farmland deals; assisting farmers and eco-associations; collecting fees for 
eco-system service providers etc.  
Public financial support is broadly used instrument in developed and developing 
countries alike - preferential credits, subsidies and grants of production, marketing, 
environmental etc. actions of farmers, rural households, businesses, and community 
organizations. Agrarian and rural development programs are common and aim 
“proportional” development of agriculture, improvement of farmers welfare (“income 
parity”), poverty eradication in rural areas etc. Nevertheless, in most developed 
countries they brought about undesired effects such as over-intensification, 
environmental degradation, and market distortions. 
In some instances pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) 
is the most effective as in the case of agrarian research, education and extension; agro-
market and know-how information; agro-meteorological forecasts; sanitary and 
veterinary control, vaccination, and prevention measures; important agro-ecosystems 
and national parks; eco-monitoring and foresight; risk assessment etc. 
Usually, specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. Necessity of combined intervention (a governance mix) is caused 
by: complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some 
less expensive forms to achieve certain (but not entire) level of socially preferred 
outcome; possibility to get extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for 
public support); particularity of the problems to be tackled; specific critical dimensions 
of governed activity; uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with likely 
impact of new forms; practical capability of Government to organize (administrative 
potential to control, implement) and fund (direct budget resources and/or international 
assistance) different modes; dominating policy doctrine [14]. 
Besides, level of effective public intervention (governance) depends on the kind of 
problem and scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be 
executed at local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require 
nationwide governance. And finally, there are activities, which are to be initiated and 
coordinated at international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to strong 
necessity for trans-border actions (needs for cooperation in natural resource and 
environment management, exploration of economies of scale/scale, prevention of 
ecosystem and climate disturbances, governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, 
local) government failures. Very frequently the effective governance of many problems 
(risks) requires multilevel governance with a system of combined actions at various 
levels involving diverse range of actors and geographical scales. 
Public (regulatory, inspecting, provision) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality and 
powerlessness) of bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well 
as restricting possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, interlinking, abuse of 
power, corruption) of public officers and other stakeholders. That could be made by 
training, introducing new assessment and communication technologies, increasing 
transparency (e.g. independent assessment and audit), and involving experts, 
beneficiaries, and interests groups in the management of public modes at all levels [14]. 
Furthermore, applying “market like” mechanisms (competition, auctions) in public 
projects design, selection and implementation would significantly increase incentives 
and decrease overall costs.  
Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all 
other modes do not work effectively [12]. “In-house” public organization has higher 
(direct and indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and 
liquidation. What is more, unlike market and private forms there is not automatic 
mechanism (such as competition) for sorting out less effective modes16. Here a public 
“decision making” is required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is 
often influenced by strong private interests (power of lobbying groups, policy makers 
and associates, employed bureaucrats) rather than efficiency. Along with development 
of general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”) and measurement, 
communication etc. technologies, efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, 
information, recommendation) and contract forms would get bigger advantages over 
internal less flexible public arrangements [14].  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than 
pure public forms given coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority 
of cases, involvement of farmers, farmers organizations and other beneficiaries 
increases efficiency - decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, 
increases incentives for private costs-sharing, and reduces management costs [14]. For 
instance, a hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out supply of non-food 
services by farmers such as preservation and improvement of environment, historical 
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and cultural heritages.  That is determined by farmers information superiority, strong 
interlinks of activity with traditional food production (economy of scope), high assets 
specificity to farm (farmers competence, high cite-specificity of investments to farm 
and land), and spatial interdependency (needs for cooperation of farmers at regional or 
wider scale), and not less important – farm’s origin of negative externalities. 
Furthermore, enforcement of most labor, animal welfare, biodiversity etc. standards is 
often very difficult or impossible at all. In all these cases, stimulating and supporting 
(assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then 
mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and 
disputing costs [22].   
Anyway, if there is strong need for a third-party public involvement but effective 
government intervention is not introduced in a due time, agrarian “development” would 
be substantially deformed. Government failure is not only possible but often prevails. 
In Bulgaria for instance, there has been a great number of bad examples for 
Government under- and over-interventions in agrarian sector during post-communist 
transition now [18]. Consequently, primitive and uncompetitive small-scale farming; 
predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted 
agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out all classes of agrarian transactions (innovation and 
extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental 
goods); development of a large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a 
result. 
2.4. Steps in analyses and improvement of governance 
The analysis and improvement of the governance of socio-economic dynamic of 
agriculture has to go though following major steps: 
Firstly, assessment is to be made on economic, social, environmental etc. 
sustainability of different agricultural systems (farm, eco-system, regional, national 
etc.), and existing and emerging problems and risks in agrarian development identified 
(Figure 4). There are worked out and widely used a great number of holistic systems 
for assessing sustainability levels and socio-economic dynamics of divers agricultural 
systems [6, 27].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Steps in analysis and improvement of governance of socio-economic dynamics of agriculture. 
 
Identified problems of development could be internal for a particular agricultural 
system or caused by other or larger systems17. In any case, persistence of serious social, 
economic and environmental challenges (problems, conflicts, risks) is a credible 
indicator that effective system of governance is not put in place. Modern science offers 
quite precise methods to detect various (social, economical, ecological) problems and 
risks associated with agrarian development. Simultaneously it provides methods to 
improve farming systems in order to mitigate socio-economic and environmental 
hazards caused by agriculture and other (man-made or natural) factors. 
Secondly, spectrum of existing and other practically possible modes of governance 
(institutions; market, private, public and hybrid forms) employed in agriculture has to 
be identified, and their efficiency and sustainability assessed. Evaluation of efficiency 
of individual modes will show their ability (potential) to deal with various challenges 
of and contribute to agrarian development at different levels. In addition, assessment of 
sustainability of existing governing structure is necessary to get idea about its 
“internal” potential to adapt (evolve, modernize, transform) to dynamic economic, 
institutional and natural environment, and meet effectively new (future) challenges and 
goals of socio-economical development18. All these would let us know whether (and 
extend to which) there will be efficient response to development objectives and 
challenges within existing system of governance. 
Third, serious deficiencies (failures) in dominating market, private, and public 
modes to solve existing and emerging problems (risks, goals) of agrarian socio-
economic development are to be specified, and the needs for a (new) public 
intervention identified. That step is to include analysis of structure and factors of 
transaction costs at local, nationwide and international scale, which eventually slow 
down sustainable growth of agrarian sector and different regions, and lead to 
insufficient and unsustainable use of resources, underinvestment and low productivity 
                                                          
17 In globalise economy many of factors affecting agrarian development are external for agriculture – food 
demand, progress in science and technologies, global warning, global financial and economic crisis, regional 
water crisis etc. 
18 Some governing modes are highly efficient in “current” economic, social and natural environment but 
unable to adapt (sustain) to evolving new (future) challenges of socio-economic development. 
Assessing sustainability level of agricultural systems, and 
identification of development problems, conflicts, and risks 
Assessing efficiency and sustainability of existing and 
other feasible modes of governance 
Identifying needs for public intervention 
Assessing comparative efficiency of different modes for 
public intervention and selecting the best one(s) 
in production, lack of innovations, holdup of social cohesion of agrarian and rural 
actors etc. 
Finally, alternative modes for public intervention to correct existing market, 
private sector and public sector failures have to be identified; and their comparative 
efficiency assessed in terms of contribution to socio-economic dynamics and 
minimization of total social costs; and the most efficient one(s) selected.  
It is essential to assess comparative efficiency of practically (technically, socially) 
possible and alternative forms of governance. Thus, additional benefits (problems to be 
solved, risks to be overcome, new goals to be achieved), and costs, and modes for a 
new public intervention must be socially admissible (acceptable). If different forms 
permit achieving the same goals, tackling the same problems, overcoming the same 
risks etc., analysis is to focus on selection of the mode minimizing the total 
(implementing and transacting) costs.  
Moreover, a form having the same (or less) costs as the alternatives is to be chosen 
if it provides more benefits or it is (socially, politically, technically) more preferable 
than other arrangements. If one of possible forms provides more benefits at the expense 
of more costs, then the selection is to be made depending on whether the additional 
costs for that public intervention are socially acceptable (and feasible) or not. Similarly, 
if there is a single (only one) mode available for governing a particular intervention 
(achieving a certain development goal) it would be introduced only if associated 
implementing and transacting costs are socially admissible (and feasible). 
At this final stage, our comparative analysis let us improve the design of new 
forms of public intervention according to the specific market, institutional and natural 
environment of a particular country, region, sub-sector19, and in terms of perfection of 
coordination, adaptation, information, stimulation, restriction of opportunism, 
controlling of participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, beneficiaries, other 
stakeholders).  
What is more, it also unable us to predict likely cases of new public (local, national, 
international) failures due to impossibility to mobilize sufficient political support and 
necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies in 
the specific economic, institutional and natural environment of a particular country, 
region, sub-sector etc. Since public failure is a feasible option its timely detection 
permits foreseeing the persistence or rising of certain problems of agrarian 
development, and informing (local, international) community about associated risks.    
3. Conclusion 
Deepening labor specialization and cooperation, and exchanges between agents opens 
up enormous opportunities for socio-economic growth of agriculture. However, it is 
also associated with significant transaction costs which might disturb sustainable 
development. In the traditional (Neoclassical Economics) framework with no 
transacting costs there is only one mechanism for governing relations between 
individuals and agrarian development. “Free market prices” (and market competition) 
effectively coordinate and stimulate the entire activity of resource owners, 
entrepreneurs, and consumers. Rare cases of market “failures” are also recognized 
                                                          
19 Effective institutions can not be “imported“ but must be designed for the specific conditions of different 
countries, regions, sectors etc. [15]. 
(“negative externalities”, “tragedy of commons”) but a perfect “government 
intervention” is seen as a remedy. All that leads to an interrupted global socio-
economic development (maximum growth in productivity, welfare, and environmental 
conservation). 
In the real economy, there are additional important factors affecting individual 
choices and socio-economic dynamics (namely institutions and transacting costs), and a 
great variety of effective governing mechanisms. The institutional environment is a 
crucial factor, which eventually determines the type and pace of development. 
Depending on personal characteristics of agents and critical attributes of each activity, 
there will be a spectrum of effective structure for organization of agrarian resources, 
activities and exchanges – some will be governed by “invisible market hand”, other by 
special contract forms, some by “visible manager hands” or within complex 
hierarchies, other will be supported by a third-party etc. Accordingly, individual agents 
will introduce new initiatives, compete on market place, contract private arrangements, 
cooperate with others to take advantage of market, technological, institutional and 
natural opportunities (and restrictions) and achieve their particular goals.  
Our new framework helps better understand the “Government’s role” in socio-
economic dynamics as well. Agrarian agents deal with market deficiency developing 
different non-market forms for effective governance (contracts, internal modes, 
collective actions etc.). Nonetheless, private sector also “fails” to safeguard individual 
rights and carry out certain activities at effective scale. That is particularly true for 
human and eco-rights, technological and infrastructural development, management of 
non-renewable resources, environmental conservation activity etc. Thus there is a 
strong need for a third-party public involvement in market and private transactions 
though institutional modernization, assistance, regulation, hybrid or public 
organization. Diverse forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency and the 
most efficient one is to be selected taking into account overall transaction costs and 
contribution to sustainable development. What is more, at present stage most public 
interventions increasingly require concerted actions (multilateral and multilevel 
governance) at local, regional, national, transnational, and global scale. Nevertheless, 
“government failure” is also possible, and inappropriate involvements, under or over-
regulations, mismanagement, corruption etc. are widespread around the world.  
References 
[1] EC, Agri-environment Measures, Overview on General Principles, Types of Measures, and Application, 
Evaluation of Measures applied to Agriculture Studies. European Commission, Brussels, 2005. 
[2] OECD, Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework, OECD, Paris, 2001. 
[3] S. Raman, Agricultural Sustainability. Principles, Processes and Prospect, The Haworth Press Inc, 
New York, 2006. 
[4] A. Salazar and I. Rios (Editors), Sustainable Agriculture: Technology, Planning and Management, 
Nova Science, New York, 2010. 
[5] UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  UN, Rio de Janeiro, 
1992. 
[6] G. VanLoon, S. Patil, and L. Hugar, Agricultural Sustainability: Strategies for Assessment. SAGE 
Publications, London, 2005. 
[7] A. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, Macmillan and Co, London, 1920. 
[8] G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science Vol. 162, no. 3859 (1968),  1243-1248. 
[9] H. Bachev, Governing of Agro-ecosystem Services. Modes, Efficiency, Perspectives, VDM Verlag 
Dr.Muller Aktiengesellscaft & Co. KG, Saarbrucken, 2009. 
[10] E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
[11] R. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4 (1937), 386-405. 
[12] O. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, .New York, (1996. 
[13] R. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960), 1-44. 
[14] H. Bachev, Governing of Agrarian Sustainability, ICFAI Journal of Environmental Law, Vol.VI, No 2 
(2007), 7-25. 
[15] D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, . 
Cambridge, 1990. 
[16] H. Bachev and M. Labonne, About Agrarian Innovations, INRA, Montpellier, 2000. 
[17] H. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, Journal of Law and Economics 12 (1969), 
1-22. 
[18] H. Bachev, Governing of Bulgarian Farms – Modes, Efficiency, Impact of EU Accession, in 
Agriculture in the Face of Changing Markets, Institutions and Policies: Challenges and Strategies, 
J.Curtiss, A.Balmann, K.Dautzenberg and K.Happe (editors), IAMO, Halle (Saale), 2006, 133-149. 
[19] E. Furuboth and R. Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New 
Institutional Economics, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1998. 
[20]  H. Bachev, Management of Environmental Challenges and Sustainability of Bulgarian Agriculture, in 
Environmental Challenges and Human Security: Recognizing and Acting on Hazard Impacts, P.Liota, 
D.Mouat, W.Kepner, and J.Lancaster (editors),  Springer, The Netherlands, 2008, 117–142. 
[21] M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Actions: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1969. 
[22] H. Bachev, Efficiency of Agrarian Organizations, Farm Management and Rural Planning 5 (2004), 
Kyushu University Press, 135-150. 
[23] T. Mori, The History of Japanese Agriculture, in Agricultural Policy in Japan, XXI IAAE Conference, 
Tokyo, 1991.   
[24] H. Bachev and T. Nanseki, Risk Governance in Bulgarian Dairy Farming, paper presented at the 12th 
Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists “People, Food and Environments – 
Global Trends and European Strategies”, 26-29 August 2008, Ghent.  
[25] K. Hagedorn (editor), Environmental Cooperation and Institutional Change, Edward Edgar, 
Cheltenham, 2002. 
[26] C. Hanson, J. Ranganathan, C. Iceland and J.Finisdore, The Corporate Ecosystem Services Review. 
Guidelines for Identifying Business Risks and Opportunities Arising from Ecosystem Change, World 
Resources Institute, Washington DC, 2008. 
[27] X. Sauvenier, J. Valekx, J., N. Van Cauwenbergh, E. Wauters, H. Bachev, K. Biala, C. Bielders, V. 
Brouckaert, V. Garcia-Cidad, S. Goyens, M. Hermy, E. Mathijs, B. Muys, M. Vanclooster and A. 
Peeters,  Framework for Assessing Sustainability Levels in Belgium Agricultural Systems – SAFE, 
Belgium Science Policy, Brussels, 2005. 
 
